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Misfeasance, Nonfeasance, and the
Self-Interested Attorney
C.D. FREEDMAN*
How extensive should the liability of an attorney acting under a "continuing power of attorney"
be? Where the donor is capable, the question is not unduly complicated. However, where
the donor is incapable and the attorney has an interest in the donor's estate, the question is
more difficult. Attorneys acting on behalf of incapable donors should conduct themselves
according to the highest standards of probity and fidelity in addition to performing their duties
competently. Unexcused breach of the duty of care should result in compensation. For breach
of fiduciary duty, restitution should be the norm rather than compensation. In the hardest
cases, it is argued that an attorney with an interest in the donor's estate should not be
allowed to profit from his or her wrong indirectly through his or her inheritance of the mis-
appropriated assets.
Dans quelle mesure un avocat qui intervient aux termes d'une << procuration perptueltle
relative aux biens >> est-it responsable? Lorsque le donataire est capable, La question ne
revit aucune complication inutile. Toutefois, quand le donataire est incapable et lavocat
d~tient un interit dans [a succession du donataire, La question s'avere plus ardue. Les avo-
cats qui interviennent au nom de donataires incapables doivent se comporter conform6ment
aux normes Les plus exigeantes de probite et de fidelit6, en plus de s'acquitter avec comp6-
tence de leurs devoirs. La violation non excusee du devoir de soin devrait aboutir 6 une
compensation. En cas de violation du devoir fiduciaire, [a restitution - plut6t que [a com-
pensation - devrait tre la norme. Dans Les cas Les plus complexes, on argue qu'un avocat
disposant d'un int6rit dans [a succession du donataire ne devrait pas pouvoir profiter indirec-
tement de ses fautes en h6ritant des biens mat acquis.
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IN THIS ARTICLE, I consider the proper scope of an attorney's liability under a
"continuing power of attorney for property" under the Substitute Decisions Act.'
This statute has been in force for a number of years and has generated considerable
jurisprudence. Unfortunately, I would suggest, the cases do not always disclose
a structured inquiry into substitutive liability, and the provisions of the statute
itself are sometimes problematic. This article examines structural issues as well
as one problematic lacuna.
It has been suggested by an eminent jurist that the fiduciary obligations of
an attorney acting on behalf of an incapable person2 approach those of a trustee.'
With respect, I disagree. I would suggest that the obligations owed to an inca-
pable person are more extensive than those of a trustee. Indeed, given changing
social circumstances and evolving legal regimes, I suggest that attorneyship' on
behalf of an incapable donor has surpassed conventional trusteeship as the de-
fhiing example of a fiduciary who must act according to the highest standards
of competency, probity, and fidelity. In respect of conventional trusts, most
beneficiaries are (or will become) able to enforce the trust and vindicate their
entitlements at some point. It is safe to assume that only in the rarest cases will
1. S.O. 1992, c. 30 [SDA].
2. Ibid., s. 6. I use "incapacity" throughout as defined by the SDA:
A person is incapable of managing property if the person is not able to understand informa-
tion that is relevant to making a decision in the management of his or her property, or is not
able to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
3. See Richardson Estate v. Mew (2009), 96 O.R. (3d) 65 at para. 48 (C.A) [Richardson Estate],
citing Banton v. Banton (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4th) 176 at para. 151 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Banton].
4. SDA, supra note 1, s. 38(1). I use "attorneyship" here to include court-appointed
guardianship for property as well.
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an incapable donor ever regain sufficient mental capacity to allow him or her to
participate directly in enforcing the attorney's obligations. Protecting the dignity
of such vulnerable people' and safeguarding their interests against exploitation
are social policies of "super-ordinate importance."' Attorneyship is a vitally im-
portant legal institution in contemporary society, and the law must foster its
proper operation; donors of such powers must have complete faith that the law
will hold their attorneys to account for misconduct. Quite simply, if the law does
not do so, continuing powers of attorney will become hollow devices.
It has recently been suggested that one of the unintended consequences of
the Substitute Decisions Act is that it created a forum for "high conflict" families
to fight with each other.' I would add that another unanticipated consequence
is the financial exploitation of older adults through manipulation of the substitute
decision-making regime; indeed, this exploitation might properly be called a form
of elder abuse. The law should respond with bright lines and effective remedies
to deter misconduct and unnecessary litigation. At least as far back as Roman law,'
it has been recognized that no mature legal system allows for a wrong to go un-
remedied. English equity, of course, developed in part to cure the defects in the
remedial response to legal wrongs and the inability of courts of law to administer
justice effectively-hence, "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy."
Indeed, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently affirmed that "[e]quity is 'the
soul and spirit of all law ... equity is synonymous with justice."'"
5. See Park v. Park, [20101 O.J. No. 1840 at para. 47 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).
6. See Re Phelan (1999), 29 E.T.R. (2d) 82 at para. 23 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), per Kiteley J. who adopts
the dicta of Dickson J. in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175.
7. Jan Goddard, "The Substitute Decisions Act: A Law of Unintended Consequences" Law
Society of Upper Canada s Special Lectures, 2010: A Medical-Legal Approach to Estate Planning,
Decision-Making, and Dispute Resolution/or the Older Client (Toronto: Law Society of Upper
Canada, 2010) at 2.
8. Ubijus ibi remedium ("where there is a right, there is a remedy"). See e.g. Great Western
Railway v. Brown (1879), 3 S.C.R. 159; Norton v. Fulton (1907), 39 S.C.R. 202; and
Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister ofEducation), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3.
9. Evans v. Gonder (2010), 259 O.A.C. 295 at para. 21, quoting William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, 2d ed. vol. 11 (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1879) at 429.
460 [2010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
I suggest that a court of equitable jurisdiction is armed with all the tools nec-
essary to ensure a wrongdoer does not profit from his or her wrongdoing where
he or she breaches fiduciary obligations owed to an incapable donor under an
attorneyship. Where the attorney breaches the duty of care, compensation should
be the norm. Where the attorney breaches his or her fiduciary duty, restitution
should be the norm. The donor's interest should be fully restored and the attorney
ought not be allowed to profit from his or her wrong. Further, in the very hard-
est of cases, where the attorney is self-interested in the incapable donor's estate,
I assert that courts may properly order a proprietary remedy to disturb testa-
mentary entitlements so as to favour innocent heirs. "Equity is not past the age
of child-bearing,"" to use a familiar phrase, and we should respond robustly to
grossly offensive conduct such as the financial exploitation of people made
especially vulnerable due to mental incapacity.
1. POWERS OF ATTORNEY WHERE THE DONOR REMAINS
CAPABLE: AGENCY
Historically, a power of attorney has been a device that has been regulated through
a combination of legal and equitable doctrines. As an agent, the attorney, like any
agent, must carry out the donor's instructions and exercise such care and skill in
the performance of his or her duties as is necessary for the proper conduct of the
business undertaken." If the provisions do not allow for a power to be exercised,
the attorney, quite simply, has no business attempting to exercise it. If the terms
of the power do allow for its exercise, the attorney is liable to compensate for
any loss that arises in consequence of its misuse. It is a simple model that the
Substitute Decisions Act extends to incapable donors. In respect of capable donors,
however, I would suggest that the law remains, and should remain, unaffected
by the statute's provisions.
10. Eves v. Eves, [1975] 3 All E.R. 768 at 771 (C.A.). The phrase was attributed to Harman J. by
Lord Evershed. See Sir Raymond Evershed, "Equity is Not to be Presumed to be Past the
Age of Child-Bearing" (1953) 1 S'dney L. Rev. I at 4.
11. See e.g. Wolsely Tool &Motor Car Co. v.Jackson, Potts & Co. (1915), 33 O.L.R. 96 (H.C.),
affd (1915), 33 O.L.R. 587 (C.A.); Tabata v. McWilliams (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 32 (H.C.),
affd (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 158 (C.A.).
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A. "ATTORNEY" AND "POWERS OF ATTORNEY"
In English law, the genesis of "attorney" as a legal term is somewhat obscure. The
origin of the word itself lay in the French atorne, the past participle of atourner,
meaning "to turn to." With the Norman Conquest, such terms migrated across
La Manche." The concept of agency-authorized representation sufficient to
bind the principal-entered English law from a combination of Anglo-Saxon
law, early Germanic law, and elements of canon and continental law that made
their way into England after the Conquest. All of these came together to recognize
isolated forms of binding representation in some circumstances, such as allowing
the agent to borrow on behalf of the Crown and binding the lender and borrower
to each other. By the thirteenth century, it was clear that there were two facets to
legally recognized representation: that relating to rights of representation and au-
dience before some courts (through the doctrine of attornatus, whereby a litigant,
the attornans, could appoint another person to represent him in the litigation"
and be bound by his representative's actions to the satisfaction of his opponent)"
and that relating to representation as a more conventional commercial agent."
12. Otherwise referred to as the English Channel. As one might expect, there is a rich history on
the evolution of English legal language. See e.g. George E. Woodbine, "The Language of
English Law" (1943) 18 Speculum 395; Roger Dahood, "Hugh de Morville, William of
Canterbury, and Anecdotal Evidence for English Language History" (1994) 69 Speculum 40.
13. See Sir John Comyns & Stewart Kyd, A Digest ofthe Laws ofEngland, 4th ed. (Dublin: Luke
White, 1793) at 618; George. E. Woodbine, ed., Glanvill, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Regni Angliae (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932). The term continued in use, to
decreasing extent, until it was formally abolished in England and Wales through the reforms
under the Supreme Court offudicature Act, 1875 (U.K.), 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 [SC]AI.
"Attorney at law" is of course still used in the United States.
14. See e.g. Frederick Pollock & F.W. Maitland, The History ofEnglish Law, 2d ed. vol. I
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1952) at 228-29; Wolfram Miller-
Freienfels, "Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: Power of Agency and Commercial
Certainty" (1964) 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 193 at 195; and Heinrich Brunner, "Early History of
the Attorney in English Law" (1908) 3 Ill. L. Rev. 257 at 261-66.
15. One might also distinguish "attorney" from the feudal ceremony of "attornment" wherein the
feudal tenant would agree to be bound to the new lord in succession. Attornment still features
as a legal term. An "Attornment and Non-Disturbance Agreement" addresses the priority of the
rights of tenants and lenders. It deals with how and when the rights of tenants will be subordinate
to the rights of lenders or, sometimes, at the lender's option, senior to the rights of lenders. See
Goodyear Canada Inc. v. Burnhamthorpe Square Inc. (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 321 at para. 6 (C.A.).
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Indeed this was the meaning of atourne as used in what is considered to be the
very first authority on English law written after the Norman Conquest, which
was, appropriately enough, written in French."
These were early and crude forms of agency that operated in quite narrow
circumstances. Over time, and with the evolution of a mercantile economy in
England, agency became a commercial necessity in such matters as brokerage,
shipping, sale of goods, and employment. One cannot imagine a sophisticated
economy being able to function without agents with authority to bind their
principals. Hence the law developed fairly briskly in the industrial age for quite
pragmatic reasons. The twofold legal treatment of agents was consistent with the
division of legal and equitable doctrines and with the differing jurisdictions of
courts of law and equity. While the common law courts tended to be concerned
with the sufficiency of the appointment to bind third parties and with the en-
forcement of the agreement between the principal and the agent as a matter of
contract law, equity became involved where its in personam jurisdiction was nec-
essary in order to make the attorney account for his or her actions and where the
agent breached his or her fiduciary obligations.
As a matter of common law, a "power of attorney" (in older usage, a "letter
of attorney") itself had no special meaning as a precise term of art to be accorded
any sort of special or sui generis treatment." Rather, it was a species of contract
and was enforced in the normal way with co-existent fiduciary obligations. As
has been pointed out by others, a power of attorney gives rise somewhat uncon-
ventionally to enforceable contractual obligations as a matter of principle.' That
To examine the colloquial use of attornment in respect of jurisdiction, see e.g. R. v. Young, (20101
O.J. No. 1991 (QL) (Ct. J.); R. v. Mitchell (2001), 51 W.C.B. (2d) 461 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
16. See Francis Morgan Nichols, Britton: The French Text Carefully Revised with an English
Translation, Introduction and Notes, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1865).
17. Of course statutes might have dealt with formalities and with the sufficiency of a sealed
instrument for certain transactions. See e.g. An Act to Amend the Law ofProperty and Trusts in
Upper Canada, S.Prov.C. 1865, c. 28, ss. 23-24; An Act to amend the Law ofProperty in
Ontario, R.S.O. 1877, c. 95, ss. 14-15.
18. See e.g. M. Jasmine Sweatman, Guide to Powers ofAttorney (Aurora: Canada Law Book,
2002) at 4-5; Kate Misurka, "Powers of Attorney: A Corporate and Commercial Application"
(2006) 26 E.T.P.J. I at 2; and Carmen S. Thiriault, "Powers of Attorney-Some Fundamental
Issues" (1999) 18 E.T.P.J. 227 at 228. See also Chantenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph,
[1891] 1 Q.B. 79 (C.A.(U.K.)); Daily Telegraph Newspaper Company Ltd. v. McLaughlin,
[1904] A.C. 776 at 780 (P.C.) (Daily Telegraph], affing (1904), 1 C.L.R. 243 (H.C.A.); and
Demars v. Chevron Standard Ltd. (1992), 83 Man. R. (2d) 58 (C.A.).
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is to say, its terms may be erforceable notwithstanding that it is set up in circum-
stances that do not necessarily feature consideration or that it is granted within a
document made pursuant to some statute that would allow it to be enforced as
a matter of law. However, this is not always the case. Certain transactions cannot
be effected through a power of attorney granted gratuitously. Hence the older
practice of using seals on powers of attorney-the seal sufficed for valuable
consideration as a matter of common law (but not in equity) and allowed the
document to be held sufficient to execute another document that was required to
be sealed." With respect to the learned authors that have considered the matter
of formalities, the point is rather tangential in most circumstances, given that the
true question is whether the donor and donee of the power intended to enter into
enforceable legal relations. Thus, even if there was an oral agreement obviously
not under seal, the power was considered good, and the courts adopted a liberal
construction of its terms in order to allow for its use in the conventions of the
trade or business in question.20 Even if the power was faulty and the agent acted
on it, the court presumed the obligation was good and enforced it accordingly."1
In an era before the advent of detailed regulation in fundamental areas such
as employment or specific forms of trade, both the common law and equity pro-
vided the necessary legal treatment of such powers of attorney in order to facilitate
arrangements. In accordance with the nature and method of the common law,
cases created a body of principles that could be predictably applied to sets of
facts as they presented themselves. Thus, the power of attorney could be revoked
(unless made irrevocable by the principal) by written instrument, oral statement,22
or act of the donor inconsistent with its continuing operation." It terminated
on performance, 24 and terms providing for its termination could be implied,"2
19. See e.g. Steiglitz v. Egginton (1815-1817), 171 E.R. 193 (Ct. Common Pleas); Berkeley v.
Hardy (1826), 108 E.R. 132 (K.B.).
20. See e.g. Entwisle v. Dent (1848), 1 Exch. Rep. 812 (U.K.); Pole v. Leask (1860), 28 Beav. 562
(Rolls Ct.); Davis v. Scottish Provincial Insurance Co. (1865), 16 U.C.C.P. 176 (Upper
Canada Ct. Common Pleas); and Brassard v. Langevin (1877), 1 S.C.R. 145.
21. See School Trustees ofHamilton v. Neil (1881), 28 Gr. 408 (Ont. Ch.).
22. See e.g. Bromley v. Holland (1802), 32 E.R. 2 (Ch.); Warlow v. Harrison (1859), 120 E.R.
925 (Exch.); The Margaret Mitchell(1858), 166 E.R. 1174 (H.C. Adm.); and R. v. Wait
(1823), 130 E.R. 50 (Exch.).
23. See Smith v.Jenning(1605-1611), 145 E.R. 32 (Exch.).
24. See Gillow and Co. v. LordAberdare (1892), 9 T.L.R. 12 (C.A.).
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but only when necessary. 2' Otherwise, the agent could assume that the power
continued until bankruptcy of the donor 2 or the donee, 28 or until either of their
deaths" (or it could pass to the personal representative of the donee if set up in
that way). Where appropriate, aspects of the agent's obligations under the
power of attorney were fiduciary in character." For example, to avoid any abuse,
a court of equity could interfere where the agent should have sought his princi-
pal's consent to enter into a transaction personally. 32 In that situation, the court
could make him a trustee for the principal as a result. 3 The policy was to make
extensive liability available to redress deceit.34 Then, as now, disputes arose over
the duty to account based upon whether the power of attorney set up fiduciary
obligations or not.35
That the power could not survive incapacity is immediately apparent; a per-
son incapable of contracting is incapable of acting as either a principal or agent,"'
with the law of contract determining the question of incapacity.
25. See Hamlyn &Co. v. Wood& Co., [1891] 2 Q.B. 485 (C.A.).
26. See Jenkins v. Gould (1827), 38 E.I 620 (Ch.).
27. See e.g. Markwickv. Hardingham (1880), 15 Ch. D. 339 (C.A.); Alley v. Hotson (1815), 4
Camp. 325 (K.B.(U.K)).
28. See Bailey v. Thurston & Co., Ltd., [1903] 1 K.B. 137 (C.A.).
29. See e.g. Adams v. Buckland, [1705] 23 E.R. 929 (Ch.);Jacques v. Worthington (1859), 7 Gr.
192 (U.C. Ct. Ch.).
30. See Foster v. Bates (1843), 152 E.R. 1180 (Exch.).
31. Where "trust and confidence" was placed on the agent. See Padwick v. Stanley (1852), 68
E.R. 664 at 664 (Ch.).
32. See e.g. Rothschild v. Brookman (1831), 5 E.R. 273 (Ch.); Harrison v. Harrison (1868), 14
Gr. 586 (Upper Canada Ct. Ch.).
33. See e.g. Lees v. Nuttall(1834), 39 E.R. 1157 (Ch.); Ross v. Scott (1875), 22 Gr. 39 (Ont. Ch.).
34. See Commercial Bank of Windsor v. Morrison (1902), 32 S.C.R. 98.
35. See Barry v. Stevens (1862), 54 E.R. 1137 (Rolls Ct.) [Barry].
36. See Daily Telegraph, supra note 18. The question normally arose not in respect of the validity
of the power in question, but rather in respect of whether an attorney or donor might be
liable to a third party or upon a transaction with a third party. See e.g. Blades v. Free,
Executor ofG WClark (1829), 109 E.R. 63 (K.B.); Drew v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q.B.D. 661
(C.A.(U.K.)); Yonge v. Toynbee (1909), [191011 K.B. 215 (C.A.(U.K)). Cf Kerr v. Town of
Petrolia (1921), 51 O.L.R. 74 (H.C.); Canada Permanent Trust Co. v. Parks (1957), 8
D.L.R. (2d) 155 (N.B. C.A.).
FREEDMAN. THE SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY 465
B. AGENTS AND THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE
It is important to note that the power of attorney as a form of agency continues
to be important and may be made by commercial actors for wholly commercial
dealings." Such powers may involve the provisions of the Powers ofAttorney Act"
to effect certain transactions. When made by natural people rather than corpo-
rations, such powers of attorney are capable of continuing beyond the donor's
later incapacity, at which time the Substitute Decisions Act is engaged and its pro-
visions govern the exercise of such powers of attorney." This point is important in
respect of the application of the fiduciary principle to simple agency relationships
set up by powers of attorney.
Equity, of course, does not normally supervise powers independently but
rather supervises a person who owes certain types of personal obligations to another.
In that context, equity might interfere with the exercise of the power in question.
Equity's intervention in such cases, however, has more to do with the fact that
the person holding the power is a fiduciary independent of the power than with
the fact that the power has an independent fiduciary character." Thus, for example,
where a trustee holds a non-compellable discretionary power to appoint property,
equity will not normally intervene unless there is a "fraud on a power," 1 that is,
an exercise of power mala fides. Here, what concerns equity is not merely the act
of exercising the power beyond its terms, but the fact that this is done intention-
ally,42 thus frustrating the intention of the donor in giving the power.4 1
The exercise of a court's equitable jurisdiction is very different in regard to
a power of attorney that sets up a simple agency than in regard to a power of
appointment exercised by a trustee. With respect to the power of attorney, the
court's jurisdiction is much narrower and is used to assist the donor in obtaining
information from the attorney to ascertain whether an action should be brought
37. See Misurka, supra note 18.
38. R.S.O. 1990, c. P-20 [PAA).
39. Supra note 1, s. 7(6).
40. See Lionel Smith, "Understanding the Power" in William Swadling, ed., The Quistclose
Trust: CriticalEssays (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 67.
41. Edell v. Sitzer (2001), O.R. (3d) 198 at para. 164 (Sup. Ct.). See also Fox v. Fox Estate
(1995), 28 O.R. (3d) 496 (C.A.); Vatcher v. Paul, [1915] A.C. 372 (P.C.).
42. See Re Brooks'Settlement Trusts, Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Tillard, [19391 3 All E.R. 920 (Ch.).
43. See generally Schipper v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 386 (C.A).
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for misuse of the power, which is answerable in damages in contract. One must
remember that in England, common law courts were separate from the equitable
courts prior to the 1875 reforms;" the common law courts had no in personam
jurisdiction over the agent with the power to force him or her to account through
injunction. However, equity judges could, in essence, compel the agent to account
for his or her actions. This was particularly important at a time when the gov-
erning rules respecting discovery were less mature than they are today. The process
is the same today, notwithstanding that courts of law and equity are fused and
talk of equity has fallen to the wayside in general.
A complication arises, however, with respect to a confusion of terms. An
agent is not necessarily a fiduciary in the sense that his or her principal placed
trust in him or her and granted discretionary powers." However, for a long time
equity has regarded an agent as having an obligation to "account" to his or her
principal and has used the fiduciary principle as a vehicle to compel the agent
to respond to reasonable inquiries. This is not the same as an obligation to "pass
accounts" as a fiduciary or to "account for profits" as a remedy for a wrong. The
difference is that in one case, equity acts to compel an agent to respond to in-
quiries to ensure that no equitable fraud has taken place, and, in the other, equity
recognizes that a wrong has been committed and requires a full statement of
transactions before deciding upon remedial consequences. In both cases, however,
equity compels the agent to explain at least some of his or her behaviour.
C. MAINTAINING A TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO AGENCY
This article suggests that agency for a capable principal and attorneyship for an
incapable donor are very different and ought to be regarded and developed dif-
ferently. Assume that an older adult gives a continuing power of attorney for
property and remains capable until his or her death. Must the attorney-as-agent
necessarily keep an account of all transactions as if he or she were acting for an
incapable donor? I contend that the answer is clearly no. Are there circumstances
in which the court can compel the agent to present detailed accounts? I would
suggest the answer is clearly yes. In each case, however, it is conventional agency,
not the statutory model of substitute decision making, that is the source of the
court's jurisdiction to compel the attorney to respond, and I would suggest further
that the point is an important one.
44. SCA, supra note 13.
45. See Knoch Estate v.Jon Picken Ltd. (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.).
FREEDMAN, THE SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY 467
An attorney for a capable donor is merely "a conduit whose role is to facilitate
contractual relations between the principal and third parties, always acting within
the terms of the appointment."" In a simple case-and assuming that the attorney
actually acted under the power-the question is only whether the donor of the
power approved the actions properly in the power itself or later ratified them by
words or conduct, as opposed to whether the attorney acted "faithfully" or oth-
erwise discharged more extensive fiduciary obligations." The donor always retains
the ability to discharge the attorney through a new instrument or through revo-
cation of the existing instrument." Thus, in Fair v. Campbell Estate, Justice
Langdon held: I
If the grantor is sui juris, he makes the decisions. He is not obliged to involve the
attorney in all or any of them. He is not obliged to ask the attorney to help him to
implement all or any of his decisions. Where the grantor is sui juris, imposition of
a duty to account can cast an impossible burden on the attorney. He c6uld be re-
quired to account for decisions over which he had no influence and for
transactions that he did not implement in whole or in part.4
This is a very orthodox approach."
I suggest that the authority of the court to compel an attorney for a capable
donor to account is not within the scope of the Substitute Decisions Act. This
authority arises under the ancillary jurisdiction of equity exercised in aid of con-
tract, whereas the statute governs the exercise of powers flowing from a continuing
power of attorney or "guardianship" where the donor is incapable. In a number
of cases in recent years, however, courts have been confronted with the question
46. Sworik v. Ware (2005), 18 E.T.R. (3d) 132 at para. 93 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). See also Banton,
supra note 3 at para. 151; Richardson Estate, supra note 3. The decision in Banton was
approved by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Richardson Estate- "An attorney for a donor
who has mental capacity to deal with property is merely an agent" (at para. 48). See also
Miksche Estate v. Miksche (2009), 97 O.R. (3d) 641 at para. 64 (Sup. Ct.).
47. See e.g. Koperniak v. Wojtowicz (2010), 57 E.T.R. (3d) 234 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Re Coupland
Estate (2005), 25 E.T.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), affd McDonaldv. Coupland Estate (2006),
25 E.T.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. C.A.).
48. See Cusinato v. Cusinato (24 November 2009) Toronto CV-09-13537 (Sup. Ct.) (WL), afl'd
on other grounds (8 April 2010) Toronto CA C51222 (WL).
49. (2002), 3 E.T.R. (3d) 67 at paras. 29-30 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Fair]. See also Harris v. Rudolph
(Attorney for) (2004), 10 E.T.R. (3d) 129 at para. 40 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Harris]; Ekelshot-
Kumelj v. Bradely, [2011] O.J. No. 45 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
50. See Barry, supra note 35.
468 12010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
of whether section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act gives the court jurisdiction
to order a passing of accounts where the donor was capable when the power was
exercised. That provision reads:
42(l) The court may, on application, order that all or a specified part of the ac-
counts of an attorney or guardian of property be passed.
(2) An attorney, the grantor or any of the persons listed in subsection (4) may apply
to pass the attorney's accounts.51
It seems that an accounting in respect of the exercise of a power that might
be drafted to survive incapacity (and thus bring itself within the statute) is in-
tended to be available through this section, notwithstanding that the donor was
in fact capable at the time the power was exercised.52 With respect, I would argue
that there really is no need to complicate matters by bringing them within the
purview of the statute and that there is every reason to leave the statute out of
the analysis. The court, regardless of the statute, retains an equitable jurisdiction
to assist the donor or his or her representative in order to avoid an equitable fraud
being perpetrated through the power. In this way, the court may utilize its equi-
table jurisdiction to make an order without reliance on the statute. The important
thing, then, is to identify a set of circumstances (say, where misappropriation was
admitted" or where there was circumstantial evidence of unconscionable or
wrongful conduct") to allow the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in a
principled way and thereafter craft an appropriate order that responds to the
circumstances of the dispute. Like in other areas, the court can control the dis-
closure of information to balance competing interests and obligations."
Consider the situation that arose in both McAllister Estate v. Hudgin"6 and
De Zorzi Estate v. Read." In both cases, to assist in the conduct of personal
51. Supra note 1, ss. 42(1)-(2).
52. See e.g. Stickels Estate v. Fuller (1998), 24 E.T.R. (2d) 25 at paras. 12-14 (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen.
Div.)); De Zorzi Estate v. Read (2008), 38 E.T.R. (3d) 318 at para. 8 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [De Zorzi].
53. See Harris, supra note 49 at para. 44.
54. See e.g. Cornacchia v. Cornacchia (2007), 154 A.C.W.S. (3d) 350 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Bishop v.
Bishop (2006), 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 338 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds (2007), 155
A.C.W.S. (3d) 743 (Ont. C.A.); Fareed v. Wood (2005), 140 A.W.C.S. (Ont. Sup. Ct.)
[Fareed]; and Mari v. DiPasquale, [2000] O.J. No. 201 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
55. This would demonstrate a preference for the court's equitable jurisdiction over competing
theories to order a trustee to disclose information to a beneficiary. See Schmidt v. Rosewood
Trust Ltd., [2003] A.C. 709 (P.C.).
56. (2008), 43 E.T.R. (3d) 313 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [McAllister].
57. Supra note 52.
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business, an attorney acted on a power of attorney during the life of an inca-
pable donor and opposed accounting to the estate trustee. In McAllister,
beneficiaries of the estate pointed to suspicious circumstances wherein the estate
trustee as attorney may have misappropriated the donor's assets. An accounting
in the conventional sense was not ordered; rather, production of records suf-
ficed." In De Zorzi, the court went further and ordered a full passing of
accounts, but the operative time frame for the accounting was only three
months." I would suggest that these cases are less about any real obligation to
maintain accounts as might be said to be part of a duty of care and much more
about the need for information to ascertain whether a claim ought to be
brought against the attorney."o
It is unnecessary in such cases to rely on the Substitute Decisions Act in prefer-
ence to general equity, and there is a good reason not to do so. The attorney was
an agent rather than a "substitute decision maker"-and agency and attorney-
ship are very different indeed.
D. ONE FURTHER POINT: THE FRAIL BUT CAPABLE DONOR
A capable donor is an autonomous actor. I have argued that a conventional power
of attorney ought not to be regarded as a continuing power of attorney where
the donor is capable, as the fundamental condition upon which the Substitute
Decisions Act arises-incapacity-is missing. Two circumstances may arise that
require clarification.
First, what of the attorney who continues to detrimentally use the non-
continuing power of attorney after the donor's incapacity? I would suggest that
it is not necessary to attempt to bring the attorney who acts on the now-
58. McAllister, supra note 56 at para. 16.
59. De Zorzi, supra note 52 at paras. 13-15.
60. See also Roger Estate v. Leung (2001), 105 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1166 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (the attorney
could be cross-examined to the same effect). In some circumstances, particularly where an
action is brought alleging an independent wrong, the court may use the Rules of Civil
Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 made pursuant to the Courts offusticeAct, R.S.O. 1990, c.
C.43 to like effect. See Kaunaite Estate v. Kazlauskas (6 November 2009), Toronto 07-1312
(Sup. Ct.) (respecting Rule 51.06(1)(b)). See e.g. Campbell v. Evert (2009), 48 E.T.R. (3d)
304 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Ontario (Public Guardian dr Trustee) v. Hawkins (20 March 2009),
Toronto 03-01109 (Sup. Ct.); and Teffer v. Schaefrs (2008), 93 O.R. (3d) 447 (Sup. Ct.)
[Teffer] (as to the Public Guardian and Trustee seeking guardianship and an accounting
thereafter).
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terminated agency into the Substitute Decisions Act for supervision. Nor is it nec-
essary to have little regard for the personal (as opposed to commercial) context
and merely rely on the rules of contract and statute to determine rights and the
scope of liability.' An attorney who continues to act where the donor is incapable
is not a substitute decision maker as contemplated by the statute because he or
she is neither appointed under a continuing power of attorney nor appointed
by the court as a guardian. Such a person is, however, a trustee-a trustee de son
tort.62 In such cases, it is not that the attorney repudiates the relationship of agency
and thus is regarded as a trustee,13 but that he or she uses the now-terminated
power of attorney to exercise dominion and control over the property." While
individuals who assume "custody and administration of property on behalf of
others" are "sometimes referred to as constructive trustees," they are "in fact,
actual trustees."" Thus, the attorney can be treated as a conventional trustee on
well-settled principles without having to extend the statute in a manner that is
both wrong and unnecessary.
Second, what of the frail donor who remains capable and who has given a
general power of attorney with immediate effect? Should the law have regard for
that person merely as a commercial actor, or would it be appropriate to bring
supervision of the attorney within the Substitute Decisions Acte I would suggest,
again, that the statute is not engaged, as the donor remains capable. However,
the fact that the donor has capacity does not mean that equity cannot extend its
jurisdiction to prevent the donor's exploitation. On the one hand, it is important
not to regard an agent as more in all cases; to repeat Justice Langdon's dicta,
"[i]f the grantor is sui juris, he makes the decisions and the agent carries them
out."" On the other hand, the presence of discretion in the exercise of a general
61. The Powers ofAttorney Act preserves the ability to bind the principal to the attorney and to
third parties, provided that the attorney "acted in good faith and without knowledge of the
termination, revocation or invalidity." Supra note 38, s. 3(1).
62. See e.g. Barnes v. Addy (1874), 9 L.R. Ch. App. 244; Mara v. Browne, [1896] 1 Ch. 199; Air
Canada v. M &L Travel Ltd., [199313 S.C.R. 787 [Air Canada]; Royal Bank of Canada v.
Fogler, Rubinoff(1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 734 (C.A.); and Paul Perrell, "Intermeddlers or
Strangers to the Breach of Trust or Fiduciary Duty" (1999) 21 Advocates' Q. 94.
63. See Air Canada, ibid. at para. 57, citing with approval Ruth Sullivan, "Strangers to the
Trust" (1986) E. & T.Q. 217 at 246.
64. See Donovan W.M. Waters, Mark R. Gillen & Lionel D. Smith, eds., Waters'Law of Trusts
in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 490-91.
65. Taylor v. Davies (1919), 51 D.L.R. 75 at para. 19 (P.C.).
66. Fair, supra note 49.
FREEDMAN. THE SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY 471
power of attorney, the possibility of influence over interests, and the frail donor's
inherent vulnerability"7 are all consistent with a wider fiduciary duty than merely
accounting for actions. As Justice Fletcher Moulton stated:
Fiduciary relations are of many different types; they extend from the relation of
myself to an errand boy who is bound to bring me back my change up to the most
intimate and confidential relations which can possibly exist between one parry and
another where the one is wholly in the hands of the other because of his infinite
trust in him. All these are cases of fiduciary relations, and the Courts have again
and again, in cases where there has been a fiduciary relation, interfered and set aside
acts which, between persons in a wholly independent position, would have been
perfectly valid. Thereupon in some minds there arises the idea that if there is any
fiduciary relation whatever any of these types of interference is warranted by it. They
conclude that every kind of fiduciary relation justifies every kind of interference.
Of course that is absurd. The nature of the fiduciary relation must be such that it
justifies the interference. There is no class of case in which one ought more care-
fully to bear in mind the facts of the case, when one reads the judgment of the Court
on those facts, than cases which relate to fiduciary and confidential relations and
the action of the Court with regard to them.68
Thus, in such circumstances, it is not that the statute is necessary for equity to
take jurisdiction over the attorney, but rather it is equity's own doctrines that
recognize a differential fiduciary obligation that arises functionally and contex-
tually in response to the vulnerability of the donor. This, of course, is not an
automatic consequence of the fact that the donor is frail, but rather of his or her
exploitation. As such, it is a high bar to liability. Thus, an attorney for a frail but
otherwise capable donor does not necessarily incur wide-ranging fiduciary obliga-
tions, but it is possible to recognize such obligations in appropriate circumstances.
II. POWERS OF ATTORNEY WHERE THE DONOR IS
INCAPABLE: ATTORNEYSHIP
In Ontario, as elsewhere, the inadequacy of the traditional power of attorney
regime for use by individuals to manage ongoing personal care and property
management has led to sophisticated substitute decision making regimes that
can survive mental incapacity.
67. See Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994) 3 S.C.R. 177 [Hodgkinson].
68. Lac Minerals Ltd v. International Coroha Resources Ltd., [ 1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 at para. 185
(Lac Minerals], citing In re Coomber, [ 1911] I Ch. 174.
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The United States led the way." In 1950, President Truman ordered the
Federal Security Agency to hold a national conference on aging. In 1954, the state
of Virginia legislated that powers of attorney could survive incapacity.70 In 1961,
the White House Conference on Aging recommended that social agencies, legal
aid and bar associations, and the medical profession study ways to facilitate the
provision of protective services to older people.7' That same year, the American
Bar. Foundation released its report The Mentally Disabled and the Law.72 In 1963,
the American National Council on Aging, Guardianship and Protective Services
for Older Adults produced a report dealing with questions of mental capacity and
financial management." The American Law Institute included durable power of
attorney provisions in its 1969 Unform Probate Code." The English Law Commis-
sion began to look at the matter in the mid-1960s and released a working paper on
the subject in 1967 and a final report in 1970.11 The Law Reform Commission of
Ontario released its own Report on Powers ofAttorney in 1972,' recommending
that the law take greater account of mental incapacity in powers of attorney. The
process of legislative reform began thereafter in Ontario and eventually produced
the Substitute Decisions Act in 1992." Nineteen years on, substitute decision making
comes to mind before commercial agency when one speaks of powers of attorney.
69. See generally Karen E. Boxx, "The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of
Fiduciary Relationships" (2001) 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1.
70. Va. Code Ann. § 11-9.1 (original version at ch. 486 (1954)).
71. See e.g. Clark Tibbets, "The 1961 White House Conference on Aging: Its Rationale,
Objectives, and Procedures" (1960) 8 J. Am. Geriatr. Soc. 373; Dale Vinyard, "White
House Conferences and the Aged" (1979) 59 Social Services Review 655.
72. Frank T. Lindman & Donald C. McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961). See Ralph Slovenko & William C. Super, "The Mentally
Disabled, the Law, and the Report of the American Bar Foundation" (1961) 47 Va. L. Rev. 1366.
73. See Virginia Lehmann & Geneva Mathiasen, Guardianship and Protective Services for O/der
People (New York: National Council on Aging Press, 1963).
74. § 5-501-505, 8 U.L.A. 418-424 (1969). See also David M. English, "The UPC and the New
Durable Powers" (1992) 27:2 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 333.
75. See U.K., The Law Commission, Powers ofAttorney (Working Paper No. 11) (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967). The final report was presented in 1970. See U.K., The
Law Commission, Powers ofAttorney (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970). The
British legislation started its own development the following year with amendments to the
governing power of attorney statute.
76. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Powers ofAttorney (Toronto: Department of
Justice, 1972).
77. See e.g. Goddard, supra note 7 at 2-5; Sweatman, supra note 18 at 23-46.
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The Substitute Decisions Act provides:
32(1) A guardian of property is a fiduciary whose powers and duties shall be exer-
cised and performed diligently, with honesty and integrity and in good faith, for
the incapable person's benefit.
(7) A guardian who does not receive compensation for managing the property
shall exercise the degree of care, diligence and skill that a person of ordinary pru-
dence would exercise in the conduct of his or her own affairs.
(8) A guardian who receives compensation for managing the property shall exercise
the degree of care, diligence and skill that a person in the business of managing the
property of others is required to exercise.
33(2) If the court is satisfied that a guardian of property who has committed a
breach of duty has'nevertheless acted honestly, reasonably and diligently, it may
relieve the guardian from all or part of the liability.7 8
The entire substitute decision making statutory scheme is predicated on the
principle that individuals are presumed capable of making their own decisions
respecting their property" and personal care."' Where a person is incapable, a
substitute decision maker has authority if previously appointed by the incapable
person in a suitable power of attorney or if appointed by the court. Alternatively,
the Public Guardian and Trustee may have statutory authority to make deci-
sions.si Without any doubt, conceptually or by operation of the statute, an
attorney acting pursuant to a continuing power of attorney for an incapable
donor is a fiduciary.
Sections 31-42 of part I of the statute form a complete statutory scheme for
the management of the incapable person's property. The fact that the statute
precludes the application of the Trustee Act82 is not a reflection of any legislative
intention that an attorney's obligations should be regarded as less than those of
a trustee. Rather, it reflects an intention that the rules developed in respect of
78. Supra note 1, ss. 32(1), 32(7)-(8), 33(2).
79. Ibid., s. 2(1).
80. See Health Care ConsentAct, S.O. 1996, c. 2, s. 4(2).
81. Obviously there are practical distinctions between the offices of attorney and guardian (for
example, in regard to the posting of security). See e.g. SDA, supra note 1, ss. 24(3)-(4), 25(1)
(provides for the posting of a bond by guardians but not attorneys). See Sundell v. Donyluk,
[2010] O.J. No. 4218 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) (where the bond was not required).
82. R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, s. 35 [Trustee Act].
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conventional trusts be inapplicable to this particular context, notwithstanding
that the basic model of law is the same.83 Hence, the Substitute Decisions Act has
its own provisions respecting the exercise of the attorney's powers that create
obligations unlike those of a trustee: a conventional trustee need not consult
with the beneficiary and/or his or her family and friends in making decisions,"8
have regard to the beneficiary's will," or give gifts or make loans to the benefi-
ciary's family or friends of property that the beneficiary has an interest in." It
would be a breach of trust to do any of these. The attorney has more than obli-
gations of investment and distribution to the donor of the power. As a substitute
for the principal decision maker, the attorney must make decisions with the same
degree of self-interest (or generosity) that the donor might reasonably display.
Moreover, these are powers and duties that "shall be exercised and performed
diligently, with honesty and integrity and in good faith, for the incapable person's
benefit""'-the obligations of the attorney thus exceed those of the trustee of a
conventionally settled trust.
Notwithstanding that the content of the attorney's obligations are different, I
would suggest that the trust comparison is apposite in respect of how the law
supervises the attorney or guardian-for example, how he or she may retire,"
pass accounts," and take compensation." The rules under the statute differ from
a conventional trust in application to context but not in concept. Thus, the best
way to conceive of the established model is as a sort of elevated trust, but again,
where the attorney's obligations exceed those of a trustee. Thus, whether the
obligation arises from the donor's autonomous act or the court's appointment
of a guardian," the attorney has a set of obligations that have to be exercised ex-
clusively in favour of a beneficiary with a life interest in the property (the donor).
83. SDA, supra note 1, s. 32(12).
84. Ibid., s. 32(5).
85. Ibid., s. 35.1. See Champion v. Guibord, [2007] 155 A.C.W.S. (3d) 982 (Ont. C.A.).
86. SDA, ibid, s. 37.
87. Ibid., s. 32(1).
88. Ibid., ss. 11, 69.
89. Ibid., s. 42.
90. Ibid., s. 40.
91. Ibid., s. 32(9). I have omitted statutory guardianship purposefully, given that this form of
guardianship is merely an administrative process that does not necessitate dissimilar
treatment in respect of the duty or standard of care owed to the incapable person.
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Additionally, he or she has an obligation to preserve such assets as are available
for those enjoying a remainder interest (those interested in the donor's estate,
be they creditors or heirs). The continuing power of attorney granted by the
donor or the guardianship ordered by the court organizes rights and liabilities
much like a conventional trust settlement.
Seen in this way, the model of attorneyship set up under the statute provides
for a conventional structure of rights and obligations, compels personal per-
formance, and draws a useful distinction between the attorney's duty of care (to
exercise the "care, diligence and skill that a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise in the conduct of his or her own affairs") and the attorney's fiduciary
obligation (to act "with honesty and integrity and in good faith").92 Thereafter,
substantive liability is more easily predictable, notwithstanding that the remedial
response to a breach may still pose difficulties.
A. THE DUTYOF CARE
It is trite law that duties of care can arise by statute, agreement, or special rela-
tionship between parties. It is equally trite law that a breach of a duty of care is
actionable negligence where loss occurs. Obviously, then, a duty of care is a legal
concept that works to ensure competent performance of obligations. Without
restating basic propositions, it is worthwhile to recall the difference between
duties of care and fiduciary obligations.
A duty of care is axiomatically differen't from a fiduciary duty, and it is
critical to maintain that substantive distinction in respect of both the appropriate
scope of substantive liability and the remedial consequences of a finding of liabil-
ity. Liability for a breach of a duty of care may be excused; a breach of a fiduciary'
duty is not excusable. Liability for a breach of a duty of care leads to compensa-
tory remedies; liability for a breach of a fiduciary duty may lead to restitutionary
remedies. Under the conventional trusts doctrine, the trustee is not the insurer
of the beneficiary's interest." He or she must administer the trust competently,
and the standard of care is the traditional standard of "ordinary prudence."" That
92. Ibid., ss. 32(1), (8).
93. See e.g. Bristol d- West Building Society v. Mothew, [1996] 4 All E.R. 698 (C.A.); Armitage v.
Nurse, [1997] 2 All E.R. 705 (C.A.) [Armitage]; and cf Strother v. 3464920 Canada Inc.,
[2007] S.C.R. 177 at paras. 157-58.
94. See e.g. Fales v. Wohleben Estate, [ 1977] 2 S.C.R. 302 [Fales]; Learoyd v. Whiteley (1887), 12
A.C. 727 (H.L. (Eng.)).
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this is axiomatically different from a fiduciary duty is apparent from the fact
that the trustee will be forgiven for technical breaches of his or her duty of care
where the trustee acts in accordance with the traditional requirements of hon-
esty and reasonableness." Unlike for a breach of a fiduciary duty, then, liability is
not strict. One sees exactly the same concept in the Substitute Decisions Act, and it
operates in the same way: the duty of care has a corresponding standard of con-
duct, and liability is tied to the ability of the attorney to seek the direction of
the court" and, where he or she does not do so, plead the statutory attorney's
defence." The object of the exercise is to promote sound management of the
incapable person's property, and hence there is a standard of care that is tied to
competence and not perfection. If it were otherwise, attorneyship and trusteeship
would both be hollow institutions as no rational person would ever accept ap-
pointment. I would suggest that a number of points can be made with respect
to the duty of care and the requirement that the attorney be capable of per-
forming to the statutory standard.
Obviously the law is intended to respect the autonomous choice of a donor
to select his or her attorney. However, as in the case of selection of a guardian
where no continuing power of attorney was made by the incapable person, there
is concern for the integrity of the office of attorney itself. Only a suitable person
should be allowed to remain in office, and so a guardianship application may be
brought to terminate the continuing power of attorney." It is vital that the person
appointed as attorney or guardian is capable of discharging the duty of care."
This is most clear in those contested guardianship cases (which seem much too
frequent) in which courts prefer one potential guardian over another, or they
prefer a neutral guardian over warring kin on the basis that mere willingness to
do the job is insufficient for appointment. One must be truly seized of the ex-
tensive nature of both the duty of care and fiduciary duties that are inherent in
guardianship of another's property and must be willing and able to act in accor-
dance with those obligations. Kinship or friendship is not enough to warrant
95. See e.g. Trustee Act, supra note 82; Re Stuart, [1897] 2 Ch. 583; Re Grindey, [1898] 2 Ch.
593 at 601 (C.A.); and National Trustees Co. ofAustralasia Ltd. v. General Finance Co. of
Australasia Ltd., [19051 A.C. 373 at 381 (P.C.).
96. SDA, supra note 1, s. 39(1).
97. Ibid., s. 33 (2).
98. Ibid., s.12 (1)(c).
99. See generally Abrams v. Abrams (2010), 54 E.T.R. (3d) 283 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
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being trusted to discharge the obligations competently, whether the obligation
arose from a power of attorney, statutory guardianship, or court-appointed
guardianship. In such cases, a neutral actor-for example, the Public Guardian
and Trustee'" or a corporate guardiana'-might be best. However appointed,
and despite any dislike for anyone with whom they must work,' 2 attorneys and
guardians must accept that their obligations are owed to the donor, that they
will not be easily removed or discharged from office,' 3 and that they will be
held accountable both substantively and in costs' for acts that do not meet the
statutory duty of care.
Second, the model clearly speaks to positive obligations that are not merely
discretionary, non-compellable powers set up in a commercial power of attorney.
These obligations go much farther than any conventional trusteeship predicated
upon the principal obligations of investment and appointment within the terms
of the settlement.
Third, the nature of the duty of care as distinct from fiduciary duties remains
in place. For example, consider the position of a co-attorney who performs to
the relevant standard of care, but a breach arises, and loss is occasioned due to
the negligent conduct of a co-attorney: liability is the same under the Substitute
Decisions Act'" as under the applicable standard of care for trustees."' In neither
case is the innocent party held accountable for the wrong of another as a matter
100. See e.g. Waffle (Public Guardian and Trustee of) v. Duggan (1999), 121 O.A.C. 294; Bennett
v. Gotlibowicz (2008), 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 533 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Bennett]. See also Lazaroffv.
Lazaroff (2005), 23 E.T.R. (3d) 75 at para. 31 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). In Lazaroff Corbett J.
commented that the Public Guardian and Trustee is not "a guardian comme les autres."
101. See Chu v. Chang, [2010] O.J. No. 1204 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) [Chu].
102. See Martin v. Beriault (2006), 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 975 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). In this case, the
court directed the warring kin, who accepted co-appointment under a power of attorney, to
"bear their feelings of the other, work together inasmuch as their personalities will permit
them so that the stated and unequivocal intention of [the donor] be honoured through the
administration in her incompetency as she had made those appointments" (at para. 10).
103. See e.g. Mullan v. Parr (2009), 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 577 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Teffer, supra note
60; and Bennett, supra note 100.
104. See e.g. Fiacco v. Lombardi (2009), 82 C.P.C. (6th) 235 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Fiacco]; Chu, supra
note 101; and Bosch v. Bosch, [2010] O.J. No. 854 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) [Bosch].
105. See Shibley v. Shibley (2004), 130 A.C.W.S. 334 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Shibley].
106. See Fales, supra note 94.
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of duty of care. Moreover, a breach of the duty results in compensation."' While
I will take up remedies below, it is nothing short of astounding to infer that the
statute limits remedies for breach of fiduciary duty to compensation. Hence,
compensation under section 33(1) is the norm for unexcused breach of a duty
of care alone. All equitable remedies remain in place as against an attorney who
breaches the fiduciary duties he or she owes to an incapable donor.
B. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY
It is trite law that agents have some fiduciary obligations to their capable princi-
pals. As already discussed, in the context of a power of attorney these obligations are
of a prophylactic nature: they seek to respond to the need to ensure that the
agent has not acted outside the scope of the power or committed some equitable
wrong. I would suggest that the Substitute Decisions Act makes much more
extensive use of the fiduciary principle in regard to incapable donors of continuing
powers of attorney and that these fiduciary obligations are at least as extensive as
those of a trustee.
While I do not want to examine the foundations of the fiduciary principle in
detail, I do wish to consider what sort of wrong is committed when a fiduciary
obligation is breached and to argue that the breach is a species of equitable
fraud."os Equity was, and remains, different from common law. Regarded as
having developed as a protection against oppression and injustice, it provided
relief against harsh laws, harsh application of law, and harsh results where the law
was inadequate. The protection of the vulnerable was the hallmark of equitable
jurisdiction. By at least 1615, the general jurisdiction in equity was recognized
as being exercised to correct men's consciences for "frauds, breaches of trust,
wrongs and oppressions of whatever nature.""' One writer described this con-
ception in this way:
The object of the Court of Chancery was, in the first instance, the purification of
the defendant's conscience. It was a cathartic jurisdiction. If a person is allowed to
remain in possession of property which it is against his conscience for him to retain,
his conscience will be oppressed; and the court, out of tenderness for his conscience,
107. SDA, supra note 1, s. 33(1).
108. This approach differs from the usual approach, which involves asking whether a fiduciary
obligation is owed in the circumstances of a given case. See Hodgkinson, supra note 67.
109. The Earlof Oxfrd's Case (1615), 21 E.R. 485 at 486 (Ch.) [spelling modernized). The case
also established that the common law prevails where there is a conflict-equity follows the law.
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will deprive him, notwithstanding his resistance, of what is so heavy a burden upon
it. This principle is at the very bottom of the doctrines of the court.no
To give effect to equity's mandate, the concept of "equitable fraud" devel-
oped, and it both pre-dates the common law jurisdiction and is a wider concept.
Equitable fraud (or constructive fraud) allowed a court of equity to provide relief
even against an act that was neither intended as dishonest nor committed reck-
lessly. As Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane said:
[I]t is a mistake to suppose that an actual intention to cheat must always be
proved. A man may misconceive the extent of the obligation which a Court of Eq-
uity imposes on him. His fault is that he has violated, however innocently because
of his ignorance, an obligation which he must be taken by the Court to have
- known, and his conduct has in that sense always been called fraudulent.1 11
This concept of equitable fraud is rooted in a pragmatic view of equity as able
to respond to an infinite variety of offensive acts' and has accordingly been left
as a fluid rather than a rigidly defined doctrine as a matter of judicial policy. At
the same time, equitable fraud is a doctrine bound up with some degree of
fault. The difficulty is in assessing the degree of fault that is sufficient for an obli-
gation to be constructed and a remedy provided in the circumstances of the case.
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that equitable fraud is wider than legal
fraud and, at least traditionally, relates to moral standards of conduct."' Not-
withstanding, the doctrine remains firmly part of Canadian law."'
The jurisdiction to avoid equitable fraud is given effect, in part, by the fidu-
ciary principle. The term fiduciary comes from the nominative case (fiducia) of
110. Walter Ashburner, Principles ofEquity (London: Butterworth & Co., 1902) at 51. See also
William Gummow, "The Injunction in Aid of Legal Rights: An Australian Perspective"
(1993) 56:3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83 at 98-99.
111. Nocton v. LordAshburton, [1914] A.C. 932 at 954 (H.L. (Eng.)).
112. See Reddaway v. Banham (1896), [1895-99] All E.R. Rep.133 at 145-46 (H.L. (Eng.)),
where Lord Macnaghten stated, "[F] raud is infinite in variety. Sometimes it is audacious and
unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring;
it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it."
113. See L.A. Sheridan, Fraud in Equity: A Study in English and Irish Law (London: Pitman &
Sons, 1957) at 188-89, 193-97.
114. See e.g. Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. v. Wyld (1877), 1 S.C.R. 604; Taylor
v. Wallbridge (1879), 2 S.C.R. 616; Guerin v. R, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Canson Enterprises Ltd
v. Boughton & Co., [ 1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 [Canson]; M. (K) v. M. (H), [ 19921 3 S.C.R. 6;
and Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 678.
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the Latin verb fido (trust)."' Once again, a historical reference helps to understand
the importance of the concept: Fides was the Roman goddess of faith and trust
who oversaw the moral integrity of Rome, and Roman law and its progeny placed
great importance on duties that arose from good faith. So too did English equity,
which was influenced by Roman law through canon law received in England
after the Norman Conquest. Similarly, contemporary Canadian equity regards
fiduciary duties as significant; discretion, influence over interests, and inherent
vulnerability are the touchstones of such duties."' Of course, not all arrangements
that create fiduciary obligations make all obligations within that relationship
fiduciary in character."' Some care therefore must be taken in setting out the
content of the fiduciary duty in question.
Given that section 32(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act deems the attorney
of an incapable person to be a fiduciary, there is no doubt that he or she is one.
Given the duties set out by the statute and the vulnerability of the incapable
donor, I would suggest that the continuing attorney for property is a fiduciary
of the highest order, even exceeding that of a conventionally situated trustee.
Moreover, I would suggest that the fiduciary principle acts both to combat mis-
feasance and to mandate performance. Conceptually, this is to say that equity
might alternately enjoin the attorney to avoid actual and apparent conflicts of
interest and give up the fruits of any breach of that obligation"' (as in the case
of a trustee or any other fiduciary),"' or it might specifically compel him or her to
act on the obligation (and neither delegate nor remain inactive). As Justice Brown
recently described the nature of the obligation, it is to act "motivated solely by a
concern, objectively-based, for the best interests of the incapable person."'20
Fiduciary obligations are important. Traditionally we have identified cate-
gories of relationships that give rise to such duties as well as functional criteria
that assist in labelling certain obligations as fiduciary in character. This exercise
115. Canadian courts can be well-skilled in etymology. See Girardet v. Crease &- Co. (1987), 11
B.C.L.R. (2d) 361 at 362 (S.C.).
116. See Hodgkinson, supra note 67; Lac Minerals, supra note 68.
117. See Galambos v. Perez, 12009] 3 S.C.R. 247.
118. For recent examples, see Watson Estate v. Beatrice Watson-Acheson Foundation (2010), 61
E.T.R. (2d) 234 at para. 18 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Zimmerman v. Fenwick (2010), 103 OR. (3d)
25 at paras. 88-90 (Sup. Ct.) [Zimmerman].
119. See Bray v. Ford, [1896] A.C. 44 (H.L. (Eng.)).
120. Chu, supra note 101 at para. 13 [emphasis in original].
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speaks to the social significance of certain types of relationships and to the impor-
tance that we attach to the fulfilment of fiduciary obligations owed by one party
to another. I would suggest that the breach of the attorney's fiduciary obligations
owed to an incapable person is so grossly repugnant to social values that the law
must respond robustly to deter such conduct.
It is important to draw a distinction, then, between acts of simple negli-
gence (that is, breaches of the duty of care that are not excused) and breaches
of fiduciary obligations (wrongs that are axiomatically different from negligence).
As noted above, in the Substitute Decisions Act, liability for the former arises
on a breach of the standard of care, diligence, and skill that a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in the conduct of his or her own affairs. Liability
under the latter arises where the attorney fails to act honestly, with integrity,
and in good faith for the incapable person's benefit. As with a trust, a single
act can breach either standard or both. However, the nature of the wrong, the
policy interest in responding to the wrong, and the remedial response are very
different. Consider the pre-taking of compensation as compared to the mis-
appropriation of funds subject to a fiduciary obligation. The former is a breach of
the duty of care answerable in damages, whereas the latter is much more serious
and gives rise to proprietary remedies where appropriate and, potentially, to
criminal liability.121
III. THE REMEDIAL RESPONSE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE
SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY
It is not my intention to survey all the possible bases for liability or all remedies
that might arise in respect of the attorney's breach of the duty of care and/or
fiduciary duties. In respect of the duty of care, the matter is rather straightforward
and leads to compensation for loss. With respect to the fiduciary duties owed by
an agent as trustee de son tort, by an agent with more extensive fiduciary obliga-
tions, and by both an attorney and guardian under the Substitute Decisions Act,
the matter is more complicated and leads to restoration of the donor's interests
and restitution of the fiduciary's gain. Here, the full panoply of remedies-from
personal money awards as equitable compensation to an accounting of profits
to proprietary remedies over assets into which the donor's interests can be traced-
121. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 331 (theft by power of attorney).
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becomes available. However, there remains a problem-that of the attorney with
an interest in the donor's estate where the donor is either incapable or too frail to
alter the status quo. Where appropriate, a court should use equitable remedies
to disturb proprietary entitlements arising through testamentary instruments or
through statute.
A. AGENCY: THE REMEDIAL GOAL IS COMPENSATION FOR LOSS
As I have argued above, powers of attorney have traditionally been treated by the
common law as setting up agencies. It is trite law that the attorney is liable in
damages for any loss occasioned from acting outside the terms of the power unless
the act is ratified by the principal. The agent is liable for loss caused by his or
her acts; the action is wholly governed by contract and the normal operation of
the Courts offustice Actl 22 in relation to interest payable on any money award.
It is equally trite law that the agent has a fiduciary obligation to respond to
reasonable inquiries. Those inquires may yield information upon which the
agent might be made liable on some other basis in law or equity or both. For ex-
ample, the agent may become a trustee de son tort for inter-meddling with the
property of the principal, or the principal may be able to seek legal or equitable
remedies as against a third party possessed of the principal's property. Again, this
is wholly conventional.
Thus, in the simple case where an older adult gives a power of attorney to a
family member to assist him or her in administering affairs, the agent has no spe-
cial obligation to keep accounts in the manner of an attorney under a continuing
power of attorney or a court-appointed guardian in respect of an incapable person
or a trustee. I have argued that cases like McAllister"' and De Zorzil2 6 are best
explained in terms of the narrow fiduciary duty to provide information to the
principal, and, where necessary, the court may take charge of that process. There
needs to be a balance between protecting the principal's rights and not exposing
agents to onerous record-keeping obligations that were not contemplated as part
of the arrangement. In the context of older adults, this also balances the interest
in protecting vulnerable people with the interest in regarding older adults as
fully autonomous actors, absent compelling circumstances to the contrary.
122. R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43 [CIA].
123. Supra note 56.
124. Supra note 52.
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B. THE DUTY OF CARE UNDER THE SUBSTITUTEDECISIONSACT: THE
REMEDIAL GOAL IS COMPENSATION
Like any trustee, an incapable person's attorney or guardian who is found by the
court to have mismanaged a donor's property is liable to compensate the donor
for losses that flow from that breach.'25 The measure of damages for compensa-
tion is "actual loss which the acts or omissions have caused."'26 Thus, there are
two requirements to trigger liability for compensation: that the breach of the
duty caused the loss and that the attorney is personally liable for the breach (that
is, the loss was not caused by another attorney's unexcused breach).127
The interest here is to promote sound management of property. Thus, the
issues that arise under this form of liability arise in exactly the same way under
the management of a conventional trust. However, whereas a trustee looks to
the trust settlement itself and to the terms of the Trustee Act as retained or ousted,
the attorney looks to the provisions of the Substitute Decisions Act as adjusted by
the terms of the continuing power of attorney. Similarly, a guardian looks to
the provisions of the Substitute Decisions Act as adjusted by the terms of the
court's order appointing the guardian and to the management plan approved by
the court. The action here arises under the Substitute Decisions Act and money
awards are subject to the normal operation of the Courts ofJustice Act in relation
to interest payable in respect of the damages awarded.
Cases under this head of liability, whether through attorneyship or trustee-
ship, are normally those that arise on any conventional passing of accounts-for
example, whether the attorney correctly identified transactions against which he
or she may take compensation.'28 Again, the law is stable on this point.
C. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY: THE REMEDIAL GOAL IS RESTITUTION
I have argued that there is a structural parallel between the duty of care and fidu-
ciary duties of a conventionally situated trustee and those of a conventionally
situated attorney to an incapable donor. I have suggested, further, that the
125. Thus where the property reverts through resulting trust there is no loss. See e.g. Re Nesbitt
Estate (2005), 19 R.F.L. (6th) 166 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Down Estate v. Racz-Down, [2009] O.J.
No. 5537 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
126. Fales, supra note 94 at 320, Dickson J.
127. See Shibley, supra note 105.
128. See Bagnall v. Bruckler, [2009] 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1195 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
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attorney's fiduciary obligations exceed those of a trustee, given the special vul-
nerabilities of the incapable donor. Somewhere in this general area, one should
properly add the attorney under a not-necessarily-continuing but general power
of attorney to a capable donor who is so frail and vulnerable that the law takes
special account of him or her and protects against misconduct by the attorney.
There is of course a difference-the attorney to the incapable donor has specific
positive obligations to act and can be compelled by the court to act (though one
would expect that the preferable course would be for a court to appoint a guard-
ian to displace the attorney acting under the power). For the purposes of remedial
response to a breach of each of these attorney's fiduciary obligations, the position
largely remains the same. Grossly offensive conduct, such as acting faithlessly
toward a very vulnerable person, should be met with a strong response as a matter
of principle.
Given the parallel with the structure of trusteeship, it is not necessary for
me to review the many ways that equity can act against the equitable wrongdoer,
which include personal money awards for compensation,129 proprietary relief of
many kinds, tracing the property into the hands of a third party, or perhaps
even identifying a third party accessory to the wrong who might also be held
liable. There are many variations on the same theme. The court uses the remedial
devices at its disposal flexibly to put the wronged party in as good a position as
he or she would have been had the breach not occurred' and also to strip the
wrongdoer of any gains arising from the wrong.
I would suggest, perhaps, one augmentation. A beneficiary is entitled to claim
property from the trustee and to compel the trustee to restore the beneficiary
to the position that he or she would have enjoyed but for the trustee's breach
of fiduciary duties. This is an expansive form of liability that seeks to take
account of the type of wrongful conduct (a breach of fiduciary duty rather than
a breach of the duty of care) and make remedies available to deter such conduct.
The court should not lightly excuse offensive conduct, even if the settlor made
generous allowance for misbehaviour."' Courts should turn their minds to the
129. For more on equitable compensation, see Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1
S.C.R. 142 at para. 84. See also Canson, supra note 114 at para. 93, Stevenson J., approving
in dissent.
130. See Hodgkinson, supra note 67.
131. For example, there is a great reluctance to give effect to exculpatory clauses in respect of gross
negligence. See Armitage, supra note 93. Cf Caponi v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (2009), 72
C.P.C. (6th) 331 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
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appropriateness of awarding compound rather than simple interest on legal or
actual rates so as to best restore the donor to the position that he or she could
have occupied. The normal rule, of course, does not favour compound inter-
est.'32 But in matters such as these, where an attorney has breached a fiduciary
obligation and equity could otherwise use proprietary and personal remedies to
like effect, it is possible.' Thus, in Bank ofAmerica Canada v. Mutual Trust
Co.,' Justice Major held:
Equity has been recognized as one right by which interest may be awarded other
than as specifically stated in ss. 128 and 129 C]A, including an award of compound
interest. ... it is of some interest that in Air.Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control
Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581 (S.C.C.), at para. 85... lacobucci J. emphasized that
in equity the awarding of compound interest is a discretionary matter. Simple breach
of contract does not require moral sanction and is usually governed by common law,
not equity.
In this case, the Court of Appeal recognized that the court has the jurisdiction to
award compound interest under the court's general equitable jurisdiction and that
an award of compound interest grounded in equity is, in the language of ss. 128( 4 )(g)
and 129(5), "payable by a right other than under this section."'>
35
Compound interest on money awards for a breach of a continuing attorney's
fiduciary duty should be the norm in order to foster a principled view of attor-
neyship and to deter misfeasance and misappropriation. Certainly, it is open to
the court to presume compound interest on money awards in respect of the mis-
appropriation of conventional trust property' and to order compound interest
even when it traces misappropriated property into the hands of a third party in
"knowing receipt."' 3 ' The breach of a continuing attorney's fiduciary duty is at
least as serious as a breach of a trustee's fiduciary obligations, and the two scenar-
ios ought to be treated similarly for the purposes of this rule.
The recent case of Zimmerman v. Fenwick' provides a useful illustration.
Here the defendant, Mr. Zimmerman, was a fiduciary to a deceased woman.
132. See CfA, supra note 122, ss. 128(1), 128(4 )(a).
133. See ibid., ss. 128(1), 128( 4 )(g).
134. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 601 [Bank ofAmerica. See also Claiborne Industries v. The National Bank of
Canada (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.); Brock v. Cole (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 97 (C.A.).
135. Bank ofAmerica, ibid at paras. 41-42.
136. See Waxman v. Waxman (2008), 240 O.A.C. 18 at para. 5.
137. See Peppiatt v. Nicol (2001), 148 O.A.C. 105 at para. 60.
138. Zimmerman, supra note 118.
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He was both an attorney under a power of attorney and a trustee in respect of
her alter ego trust (remainder to charitable beneficiaries). The donor was eighty-
one years old, frail, and in ill health when the power was granted. Her capacity
was not an issue before the court, and I assume that she was capable until her
death, notwithstanding that she was in quite ill health. Shortly after making the
power of attorney, the donor moved from her private residence into hospitals or
seniors' residences where she stayed until her death four years later. After her
death, the estate trustees sought to have Mr. Zimmerman, as attorney/trustee,
pass his accounts under both the power of attorney and the trust for the time
that he held both offices (he was replaced as trustee after the donor's death).
There was protracted litigation in respect of the preparation of the accounts and
in respect of objections made by the estate trustees. The accounts as presented
by the attorney as trustee were "inadequate, incomplete and in many respects
false."' The attorney/trustee failed to account for cash withdrawals, loans he
made to himself, and transactions entered into on behalf of the donor and trust.
His lack of record-keeping and his failure to respond to reasonable inquiries
"frustrated the court's ability to fairly assess his conduct as attorney and trus-
tee." 1o Moreover, he actively obstructed attempts to get an accounting by the
estate trustees and beneficiary. Justice Strathy remarked that his conduct was
egregious" and held:
Considering that Mrs. McMichael was resident in hospitals and nursing homes
during almost the entire period covered by the Trusts, there was an onus on Mr.
Zimmerman to explain how these expenses could possibly have been for her benefit
or related to his duties in the administration of the Trusts. It is simply impossible
to objectively determine whether any of these expenses were legitimate expenses on
behalf of Mrs. McMichael or the Trust. Only Mr. Zimmerman is in a position to
explain and justify the expenses. It is not sufficient for him to make general state-
ments, such as assurances that he acted with the "utmost rectitude" at all times. He
had an obligation to demonstrate that each challenged disbursement was properly
made. He made no attempt to do so. 142
A litany of complaints were brought against the defendant as attorney and trus-
tee. Suffice it to say that Mr. Zimmerman breached his duties thoroughly and
fundamentally.
139. Ibid. at para. 38.
140. Ibid at para. 40.
141. Ibid at para. 49.
142. Ibid. at para. 40.
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One issue was the pre-taking of compensation by the defendant as trustee.
Normally, a trustee is not entitled to pre-take compensation. An attorney for an
incapable person is, by contrast, entitled to do so under the Substitute Decisions
Act."' This is a functional rather than a principled distinction: whereas a trustee
is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation on the traditional tariff as ad-
justed by the court,'" an attorney is entitled to the prescribed rate set out in the
Regulation.i1s In neither case can the trustee or attorney merely help himself to
the managed funds. Thus, whether one calls it mistaken pre-taking or merely a
mistake in management, there is a world of difference between negligence and
misappropriation. In this case, a defence was advanced, and rejected, that the
attorney's misconduct could more properly be seen as a breach of the duty of
care (improperly but honestly pre-taking compensation) rather than a breach of
fiduciary duty (misappropriating property of the donor). Justice Strathy held:
In this case, the trust deed impliedly permitted pre-taking. It stated:
Any of the Trustees may take and be paid out of the Trust Fund or the in-
come there from or both in such proportions as the Trustees see fit such
compensation as is reasonable having regard to the size of the Trust Fund
and the time and effort expended by him or her in connection with the ad-
ministration of the trusts herein contained.
The authority to pre-take compensation did not relieve Mr. Zimmerman of the re-
sponsibility to ensure that the pre-taking was reasonable, and this required that a
reasonable calculation be made and that a record of the taking and the calculation be
preserved. In the absence of such a record, the court and the beneficiaries have
no way of distinguishing between a taking of compensation, a loan or a defalcation.
Mr. Zimmerman failed to keep any record of his pre-takings of compensation, al-
* though he was required to do so by the SDA in relation to the Power of Attorney.
There is no record whatsoever of his calculations of the compensation to which he
was entitled. There is no evidence at all that he ever communicated with the benefi-
ciaries of the Trust, or with any of the professional advisors, to explain that he was
pre-taking compensation or the basis on which it was being calculated. Although he
suggested at one point in his evidence that he was taking compensation quarterly,
the evidence does not bear this out.
143. Supra note 1, s. 40(1).
144. Trustee Act, supra note 82, s. 61. See Laing Estate v. Hines (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 571 (C.A.).
145. 0. Reg. 159/00, s. 1.
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I accept that somewhere in the back of his mind Mr. Zimmerman knew that he
was entitled to compensation as a trustee and he may even have made some sort of
rough and ready calculation of his entitlement. If that is what he was doing, the
onus was on him to ensure that his takings were reasonable and appropriate in all
the circumstances. The onus was also on him to ensure that his takings were open
and documented. He did none of these things."
It was clear, then, that the defendant, as trustee and attorney, acted improp-
erly by any standard. What is puzzling about Zimmerman, and other decisions like
it,"' is the remedy:
I come to these conclusions on the undisputed evidence and on the basis of Mr.
Zimmerman's own admissions. In light of these conclusions, Mr. Zimmerman is en-
tided to no compensation for his services as attorney and trustee.
Mr. Zimmerman will be required to repay the amounts that he has pre-taken by way
of compensation, in the total amount of C$356,462.50 and US$85,400.00, together
with pre-judgment interest from the date of each taking.
For the reasons given, Mr. Zimmerman shall repay the sum of $34,064.55 paid to
Reynolds Accounting Services for the preparation of accounts.
Mr. Zimmerman must also reimburse the Trust for $2,000.00, being the value of
the missing Lismer sketch."
It seems clear in this case that no matter how the fiduciary duty was constructed
(that is, as attorney or as trustee), the defendant breached not merely the duty
of care but also his fiduciary duties. He took money for his own benefit in sums
that could not be considered reasonable, kept few records, frustrated all attempts
at accounting, and was ultimately denied compensation. Given that the proceed-
ings may not have yet terminated at trial, perhaps I have misconstrued the state
of the litigation. However, assuming for the sake of argument that my appre-
hension of the facts is accurate, one would think a remedy that reflected the
seriousness of the breach was consistent with an award of compound interest
based on actual or the legal rates, whichever is higher.
146. Zimmerman, supra note 118 at paras. 76-86.
147. See also Volchuk Estate v. Kotsis, [2007] 159 A.C.W.S. (3d) 157 (Ont. Sup. Ct.);Jacobs
Estate v. Hershorn, [2006] 23 E.T.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Sup. Cc.); Fareed, supra note 54; and Re
York Estate, (7 August 1998) 086/93 Toronto (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)).
148. Supra note 118 at paras. 114-17.
FREEDMAN, THE SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY 489
D. THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY
In the last fifty years or so in Canada, England, Australia, and elsewhere, the
nature of the constructive trust has been closely examined. Such a trust was said
to have operated, in traditional terms, either "institutionally" or "remedially."
Institutionally meant, for example, that some exceptional trusts could be fully
constituted by the court on the basis that the settlor did everything he or she
could have done to perfect the trust, but there was still a failure to vest in cir-
cumstances where that the failure was not attributable to the settlor. Hence the
court could "perfect the imperfect gift" through a constructive trust institution-
ally and without reliance on judicial discretion.' The remedial constructive trust
(or other forms of proprietary relief in equity) is much more contentious-remedy
for what? The utility and significance of the development of the law of unjust
enrichment becomes immediately apparent: it could provide an explanation for
why a mistaken payment might yield a restitutionary rather than a compensatory
remedy' or why quantum meruit arises in autonomous unjust enrichment based
on the reasonable expectations of the parties.151
Those who take an expansive view of unjust enrichment take a correspond-
ingly narrow view of equity and its traditional soft standard of "conscience";152
spirited defences of equity and conscience as creative devices are not meant for
them.1 3 The conscience standard in equity masks discretionary decision making
and sloppy thinking ("palm-tree justice") and ought to yield to the quasi-scientific
149. See Rose v. Island Revenue Commissioners, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1217 (C.A.).
150. See Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. (1976), [1981] Ch. 105.
151. I have considered the question in some detail elsewhere. See C.D. Freedman, "Unjust
Enrichment Claims Against the Estate Based on the Provision of Services to the Deceased"
(2009) 29 E.T.P.J. 163.
152. See e.g. Peter Birks, "Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy" (1996) 26
U.W.A.L. Rev. 1; Peter Birks, "Annual Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience and Unjust
Enrichment" (1999) 23 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 1.
153. See Lord Neuberger MR, "Has Equity Had Its Day?" (Common Law Lecture, delivered at
the Faculty of Law, Hong Kong University, 12 October 2010), online: <http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-hong-kong-lecture-
12102010.pdf>. See also Sir Anthony Mason, "Themes and Prospects" in P.D. Finn, ed.,
Essays in Equity (Sydney: The Law Book Co. Ltd., 1985) 242; Sir Anthony Mason, "Equity's
Role in the Twentieth Century" (1997) 8 King's College L.J. 1; and Lord Justice Millett,
"Equity-The Road Ahead" (1995) 6 King's College L.J. 1.
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approach of unjust enrichment. Some commentators, like Peter Birks, argue for
a more civilian approach to equity and a categorization of juristic reasons or un-
just factors that might justify an enrichment staying with or returning to one party
or another.'1 1 Certainly a remedy for a legal wrong like fraud (deceit) was one
factor that might justify proprietary relief, whereas this result was less certain in
the case of equitable fraud. Canadian courts accepted a middle ground-saying
yes to unjust enrichment and an autonomous action in unjust enrichment and
also saying yes to traditional equity.' I would suggest that the pragmatic Ca-
nadian approach preserves equity as important and flexible, but the approach
simultaneously allows for greater precision in how the court may act where there
-is no traditional wrong or doctrine to explain why an enrichment and corre-
sponding deprivation is suspicious and might yield to an order restoring the
status quo.
Thus far in this article, I have discussed the obligations of an attorney under
a continuing power of attorney acting for an incapable donor. I have also re-
marked upon both the attorney's duty of care and his or her extensive fiduciary
obligations owed to the donor. Liability in these circumstances does not arise in
autonomous unjust enrichment; rather, liability arises under the Substitute Deci-
sions Act or in equity, as appropriate to the circumstances. There must be a wrong
that drives liability. At one extreme of attorney liability (breach of the duty of
care), liability may be excused-there is a statutory defence and a very good public
policy reason to forgive the honest and reasonable attorney from liability. At the
other extreme (egregious breach of fiduciary duty), liability is never excused, and
the remedial response is robust. The question that remains to be confronted is
this: how expansive can the remedial response be to this sort of wrongful conduct?
Can it go so far as to disturb proprietary entitlements of a very particular kind,
such as those that arise as a matter of inheritance? I suggest that the answer is
yes and that the court has jurisdiction to use a constructive trust to, in essence,
order that the attorney is incapable of inheriting from the wronged donor either
to the extent of the wrong or, perhaps, at all. This should not be an automatic
response. I suggest merely that we recognize that if attorneyship is to be fostered
as a legal institution, we must ensure that egregious wrongs do not go unremedied
154. Birks, supra note 152.
155. See Garland v. Consumers' Gas, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 [Garland]. Interestingly, treatment of a
problem can move from one category into the other; cf Kerr v. Baranow (2011), 328 D.L.R.
(4th) 577 (S.C.C.), abandoning resulting trust for treatment in unjust enrichment.
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and that wrongdoers are not allowed to profit, even indirectly, from their
wrongs. This is true for both misfeasance and nonfeasance.
Consider the following scenario. An older adult gives a continuing power
of attorney for management of his or her property to an adult child. The donor's
will leaves his or her estate to the children equally. The attorney accepts the
appointment and, under the donor's direction, the attorney uses the power while
the donor remains capable. Under these circumstances, the attorney is the agent
of the donor. The donor is later diagnosed with dementia and is incapable of
managing his or her property. The Substitute Decisions Act is now fully engaged,
and the obligations owed by the attorney to the donor are extensive: the attorney
is a fiduciary of the highest order. When left unsupervised by the donor, the
attorney acts badly-perhaps he or she misappropriates property or merely omits
to do anything at all. As a result, the donor is denied the use of his or her funds.
Perhaps the effect of this lost opportunity is not keenly felt in the circumstances
of this particular donor. Alternatively, it is all too keenly felt-those who are
familiar with the variability in quality of available long-term care facilities and
personal care assistance will instantly appreciate the differences that might arise
between an incapable donor with assets and one without. In any case, in this
way the attorney is able to take an advance on his or her expected inheritance or
preserve the assets of the donor to enhance his or her expected future share of
the estate, or both.
Aside from the possibility of stanching the bleeding through the appoint-
ment of a guardian while the donor remains alive, one would think, based on
the foregoing discussion, that the proper course would be an action against the
attorney for breach of the duty of care and breach of fiduciary duty. However
the matter is brought before the court, and in whatever form, what should be
the proper remedial response? Obviously a money award is one such response,
but at first blush it would seem that whatever remedy is ordered may well prove
ineffective. If the order is made inter vivos, and assuming that the donor dies
with assets and that the estate is solvent, the attorney is, in effect, merely forced
to pay money into a sort of escrow to be claimed in some remaining part later
as a gift due to him or her under the will. If the money is paid to the donor's
estate after his or her death, the attorney seems to transfer the money from one
pocket to another. Such a result is inadequate.
To my mind, the resolution of the lacuna set out above relies upon the law
fostering the integrity of attorneyship through appropriate standards of conduct
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and effective remedies to respond to improper conduct, both negligent and
fraudulent in character. If necessary, and with some trepidation, I suggest that
in appropriate cases the court should retain equitable discretion to respond to
an egregious case of fiduciary wrongdoing by disturbing the entitlements due to
him or her in the donor's will or that would run in his or her favour through
the intestacy rules. What, then, should the result be? The attorney should have
to provide compensation with compound interest to the estate unless the donor
or his or her estate might be better off by claiming a proprietary remedy against
property into which the misappropriated money can be followed or traced. This
has the effect of both restoring the donor's interest and forcing the attorney to
disgorge any gain. Thereafter, I would suggest that the trustee should be held
incapable of inheriting any share of the estate up to the amount awarded against
the attorney; that is, the attorney should be a constructive trustee in favour of
innocent heirs to that amount. If appropriate, as in the case of nonfeasance that
produces a difficulty in quantifying the harm, the court ought to presume com-
plete inability to inherit. Additionally, the attorney should have the onus of
rebutting that presumption and establishing a quantum that the court might in
good conscience (as a "Court of Conscience," to use the ancient phrase) allow
the attorney to retain. I will endeavour to explain why I suggest that this solution
is appropriate in law and on policy grounds.
In a case concerning the extent of liability for the equitable wrong of a
breach of confidence, Lord Goff stated, "The statement that a man shall not be
allowed to profit from his own wrong is in very general terms, and does not of
itself provide any sure guidance to the solution. of a problem in any particular
case."'11 Lord Goffs point was that equity should not be used in an unpredictable
and undisciplined way. While equity may respond creatively within its jurisdic-
tion, "equity acts consistently and in accordance with principle.""' I suggest
that proceeding as I have argued above would be in accordance with the principle
that "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without aremedy" and that a remedial
constructive trust or other appropriate relief may be ordered to remove the profit
from any wrong accruing to the wrongdoer.
Thus, I would suggest that the jurisdiction to disturb proprietary entitlements
through proprietary remedies in equity can be understood as follows: first, we
156. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at 268 (H.L. (Eng.)).
157. Muchinski v. Dodds (1985), 160 C.L.R. 583 at para. 7, Deane J. (H.C.A.).
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look to the nature of the wrong to discover whether the harm is sufficiently sig-
nificant to allow for such a powerful remedy to be ordered; and second, we
consider whether the remedy is appropriate in the circumstances of the case-
that is, would there be unintended and deleterious effects on third parties that
might otherwise have equally good, or superior, claims against the property to
be made subject of the order. Thus, as Justice McLachlin said in Soulos v. Kor-
kontzilas, a constructive trust might arise in response to an equitable wrong in
the form of a breach of fiduciary duty as a matter of orthodoxy:
The constructive trust imposed for breach of fiduciary relationship thus serves not
only to do the justice between the parties that good conscience requires, but to hold
fiduciaries and people in positions of trust to the high standards of trust and probity
that commercial and other social institutions require if they are to function effectively.
It thus emerges that a constructive trust may be imposed where good conscience so
requires. The inquiry into good conscience is informed by the situations where
constructive trusts have been recognized in the past. It is also informed by the dual
reasons for which constructive trusts have traditionally been imposed: to do justice
between the parties and to maintain the integrity of institutions dependent on trust-
like relationships. Finally, it is informed by the absence of an indication that a
constructive trust would have an unfair. or unjust effect on the defendant or third
parties, matters which equity has always taken into account. Equitable remedies
are flexible; their award is based on what is just in all the circumstances of the case.
Good conscience as a common concept unifying the various instances in which a
constructive trust may be found has the disadvantage of being very general. But
any concept capable of embracing the diverse circumstances in which a constructive
trust may be imposed must, of necessity, be general. Particularity is found in the
situations in which judges in the past have found constructive trusts. A judge faced
with a claim for a constructive trust will have regard not merely to what might seem
"fair" in a general sense, but to other situations where courts have found a con-
structive trust. The goal is but a reasoned, incremental development of the law on
a case-by-case basis.158
I would suggest that the institution of attorneyship is socially significant, depends
on high standards of trust and probity, and requires, as a matter of good con-
science, that attorneys be prevented from profiting from wrongs, either directly
or indirectly. It is the very best example of a circumstance in which wrongdoing
might be properly addressed through the imposition of a constructive trust.
What, then, of the testamentary context? On the one hand, we need not be
concerned with how third parties like creditors might be affected if we recognize
158. [19971 2 S.C.R. 217 at paras. 33-35.
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that it is only the attorney's inheritable share that is at issue. That is, the question
arises only if the estate is solvent and creditors' claims have been satisfied. Thus,
if the attorney restores the estate to the position in which it should have been on
the donor's death and third-party creditors have a superior claim to the assets of
the estate, the question of disturbing the attorney's inheritance never arises. The
solution works well, as third parties may now look to the restored assets to satisfy
their claims and the wrongdoer no longer profits from his or her wrong.
We are still left with the converse situation: the estate is solvent and the
attorney is in a position to recoup, in whole or in part, the money restored. If
he or she pays to the estate and there is an equal division between his or her sib-
lings and him or herself, then he or she is allowed to retain his or her share of the
proceeds paid. While this does not allow the attorney to profit from the wrong,
it certainly provides a discount to the award and provides no deterrence to other
wrongdoers. Obviously, we are not dealing with criminal punishment, but it is
important to foster the integrity of attorneyship: wrongful conduct must be
deterred, particularly fiduciary wrongs in respect of highly vulnerable people.
The law does not interfere easily with proprietary entitlements flowing from a
testamentary instrument any more than it disturbs proprietary entitlements in other
contexts."s' In the testamentary context, there is, however, jurisdiction based on
the conduct of the heir both at common law and under the Quebec Civil Code.'
There is long-standing, but somewhat uncertain, jurisprudence "' not to allow
159. Indeed, I would suggest that context is everything here. For a discussion of the context of
commercial partnerships, see Olson v. Gullo (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 790 (C.A.).
160. Art. 621(1) C.C.Q It states, "The following persons may be declared unworthy of inheriting ... a
person guilty of cruelty towards the deceased or having otherwise behaved towards him in a seriously
reprehensible manner." See also Pichic. Fournier, [2010] R.J.Q 455 (CA) [Piche. Pichi establishes
that such conduct includes non-criminal conduct such as fraud and abuse of the deceased-"it
covers a broader scope than that of the commission of a crime" (at para. 26) [translated by
author]. The offensive conduct must either be intentional or voluntary. Thus, a successful
defence of not criminally responsible to a murder charge may allow the murderer to inherit.
161. See e.g. Demeter v. Dominion Life Assurance Co. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 560 (C.A.); Cleaver v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, [1892] 1 Q.B. 147 (C.A.(U.K)); Houghton v. Houghton,
[1915] 2 Ch. 173; Re Gore [19721 1 O.R. 550 (H.C.J.); R. v. National Insurance
Commissioner, [1981] 1 All E.R. 769 (Q.B.); and Dunbar v. Plant, [1998] Ch. 412 (C.A.).
See The Law Commission, The Forfeiture Rule and the Law ofSuccession: A Consultation
Paper (London: Law Commission, 2003); Tasmania Law Reform Institute, The Forfeiture
Rule (Issues Paper No. 5) (Tasmania Law Reform Institute, 2003); Timothy Youdan,
"Acquisition of Property by Killing" (1973) 89 Law Q. Rev. 235; and Andrew Hemming,
"Killing the Goose and Keeping the Golden Nest Egg" (2008) 8 L. & Just. J. 342.
FREEDMAN, THE SELF-INTERESTED ATTORNEY 495
those who unlawfully cause the death of another to inherit from the deceased's
estate, receive insurance proceeds on the life of the victim, or take property under
the doctrine of survivorship in respect of joint tenancies. In Brissette Estate v. West-
bury Life Insurance Co., 162 the insurer sought to avoid payment under a life
insurance policy where a husband murdered his wife. As the designated beneficiary
of the proceeds, the husband renounced his claim in favour of her estate and then
sought to have the proceeds of the policy paid into the estate.
The issue in Brissette Estate was whether the insurance policy should be en-
forced and, if so, whether a constructive trust might arise against the murderer. For
the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, Justice Sopinka denied the claim on
both bases. The contract of insurance contemplated that the husband would benefit
but he could not do so based on the traditional rule that one who murders the in-
sured cannot claim insurance proceeds on the victim's life. The dissenters, Justices
Gonthier and Cory, would not allow the murderer to inherit but were of the opin-
ion that the contract should be enforced narrowly in favour of innocent heirs;
otherwise the insurer would seem to gain inappropriately. Justice Sopinka held:
In order to determine whether, as a matter of public policy, the Court should resort
to the device of a constructive trust, it is appropriate to consider whether the applica-
tion of public policy which denies payment to the felonious beneficiary would work
an injustice if recovery is denied to the appellants. After all, it is this policy that
pievents the contract from taking effect in accordance with its terms. If denial of
recovery by the estate is not inconsistent with this policy, then there is no misuse
of public policy which would warrant a conclusion that its application is unjust.
The rationale of the policy which denies recovery to the felonious beneficiary is
that a person should not profit from his or her own criminal act.
But, even if I had concluded that the denial of recovery to the estate was inconsistent
with public policy, in my opinion it would be contrary to established principles of
equity to employ a constructive trust in this case. A constructive trust will ordinarily
be imposed on property in the hands of a wrongdoer to prevent him or her from
being unjustly enriched by profiting from his or her own wrongful conduct. For
example, in Schobelt v. Barber, [1967] 1 O.R. 349 (H.C.), the court imposed a
constructive trust on property which passed to a joint tenant who had murdered
his co-tenant. By virtue of the instrument creating the joint tenancy the surviving
tenant acceded to the whole property. In order to prevent the wrongdoer from being
unjustly enriched, the whole property was impressed with a constructive trust with
the estate of the deceased joint tenant as beneficiary of one-half of the property.
162. [199213 S.C.R. 87 [Brissette Estate]. See also Re Dreger (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 371 (H.C.).
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The requirement of unjust enrichment is fundamental to the use of a constructive trust.
In this case, no claim of unjust enrichment has been made out. It cannot be said
that but for Gerald's act, Mary's estate would have recovered the money. The
wrongdoer does not benefit from his own wrong, nor is the insurer in breach of its
duty to Mary. It is simply complying with the express terms of the contract.
Moreover, there is no property in the hands of the wrongdoer upon which a trust
can be fastened. By virtue of public policy the provision for payment in the insur-
ance policy is unenforceable and no money is payable to the wrongdoer. The effect
of a constructive trust would be to first require payment to the wrongdoer and
then impress the money with a trust in favour of the estate. 163
Thus, a constructive trust can arise in testamentary circumstances in relation to
unjust enrichment, which, in the majority's view, did not occur on the facts of
the case before the Court.
Brissette Estate arose before the authoritative recognition of autonomous
unjust enrichment as an action in Garland v. Consumers' Gas.'" Today, we would
approach the matter as follows: if the contract, will, or other instrument is effec-
tive to convey the interest, then autonomous unjust enrichment does not arise;
there is a traditional juristic reason for the gain. Of course, the law may hold
the instrument (like the insurance contract)16 1 to be ineffective where, say, the
beneficiary murders the insured. Given that we do not conceive of unjust en-
richment any more than equity in general as a vehicle to promote discretionary
decision making at large (unjust enrichment relates to absence of juristic reason,
not "justice"), then one returns to the wrong itself and its remedy. This allows
for principled and controlled evolution of doctrine within the area of law giving
rise to the wrong substantively, rather than removing the matter to unjust en-
richment at large for resolution.
163. Brissette Estate, ibid. at paras. 7-16.
164. Supra note 155. See also Oldfield v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada, [2002]
S.C.R. 742 at paras. 24-28. In this case, the insured died while committing an illegal act that
was the cause of death (smuggling cocaine-filled condoms in his stomach that burst). The
insurer sought to avoid paying the proceeds under the contract of insurance on the insured's
life. In considering the extent of the forfeiture principle as set out in Brissette Estate, ibid.,
the Court held that the principle does not extend so far as to prevent the proceeds being paid
to an innocent beneficiary where the insured did not intentionally cause the loss insured
against. That is, innocent beneficiaries are not affected by the public policy that a person
ought not to be able to insure against his or her own criminal act and thus profit from a wrong.
165. Cf Richardson Estate; supra note 3.
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Thus, we return to equity and policy in respect of equitable wrongs. Having
argued that a constructive trust is available as a remedy to force restoration, make
restitution, and prevent the wrongdoer profiting from his or her wrong, it is only
necessary to determine how such an investigation might be structured in the
facts of a given case. I would suggest that the method I have proposed helps to
treat the case of the attorney who does nothing at all in the face of the donor's
need as well as the case of the attorney who misappropriates. Both interfere
with the donor's lost opportunity to have the benefit of his or her assets in a
way that is much more than merely a question of the value of the assets. If the
donor was alive, of course, we could (in theory) intervene to order that the at-
torney personally perform the obligations. One would think that such a faithless
and neglectful attorney would be an unsuitable person and should be replaced
by a guardian; indeed, we might say that the attorney should give way to the
guardian and ought to suffer in costs in any proceedings that arise unnecessarily
in respect of the appointment of a guardian in succession."' The preferable ap-
proach is to reverse the onus and put the attorney to the task of showing that
the court in good conscience should allow him or her to take of the inheritance
that would otherwise accrue to him or her. Such a method speaks both to the
nature of the wrong and to the court's equitable jurisdiction and puts the onus
of quantification of the appropriate money award on the wrongdoer, rather than
on the donor's estate or innocent heirs., This seems an appropriate result in
principle and would work pragmatically as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Powers of attorney set up an agency in traditional practice. Under the regime
created by the Substitute Decisions Act, attorneyship under a continuing power
of attorney in respect of an incapable donor means much more. For this impor-
tant institution to evolve properly, the law must develop and foster a principled
approach to both attorney liability and the remedial response to such liability.
166. It seems quite apparent that the trend is to not encourage litigation on powers of attorney or
in respect of guardianships for either property or personal care and to use the costs rules to
deter litigation. See e.g. Bosch, supra note 101; Chu, supra note 101; Bennett, supra note 100;
Bailey v. Bailey (2009), 55 E.T.R. (3d) 198 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Fiacco, supra note 104; and
Teffer, supra note 60.
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One must distinguish between the duty of care and the extensive fiduciary obli-
gations owed to the donor. Upon breach, compensation follows the former, and
restoration and restitution follow the latter. Where appropriate, and in extreme
cases, courts of equitable jurisdiction should use the full range of equitable pro-
prietary remedies to ensure that an attorney who breaches his or her fiduciary
duties does not profit from the wrong directly or indirectly, even to the extent
of disturbing inheritable interests in the donor's estate by the attorney. This
should not be an automatic response. Rather, if we recogrnize that attorneyship
is to be fostered as a vital legal institution, we must ensure that egregious wrongs
do not go unremedied and that wrongdoers are not allowed to profit, even indi-
rectly, from their wrongs.
